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Class actions provide an important mechanism for plaintiffs to 
obtain justice where they would otherwise have no recourse. Those 
willing to wield its power use class actions to aggregate their claims 
with other similarly situated individuals. This combined force is often 
the only way to fight large corporations that would otherwise be 
impervious to individual claims. One of the primary goals of the class 
action is to give an individual a realistic and economic opportunity to 
obtain redress.1 Unfortunately, the nature of class action lawsuits is not 
as straightforward as many of its purported goals. As the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “the class action is an awkward 
device, requiring careful judicial supervision.”2 Indeed, with recent 
changes in the legal landscape of class actions,3 it has become 
particularly important for courts to operate with careful regard to the 
demands of class actions. The Seventh Circuit, a strong advocate of 
class action reform, has attempted to lead in this respect.4  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., June 2003, Northwestern University. 
1 S. REP. 109-14, at 83 (2005). 
2 Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
4 See Iain D. Johnston, Survey of Seventh Circuit Decisions: Class Actions, 36 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837 (2003). 
1
Choi: Class(less) Action Reform
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
515 
As a general matter, the Seventh Circuit has exhibited a high level 
of distrust towards class action counsel operating on the state level.5 
Class action plaintiffs and their counsel, surely aware of this distrust, 
have taken specific steps to avoid removal of class actions filed in 
Illinois state courts.6 Recent legislation, however, has further 
broadened federal jurisdiction over class actions with diverse parties, 
making it even more difficult for class action plaintiffs to avoid federal 
courts.7 Notwithstanding the major changes initiated by the Class 
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),8 the Seventh Circuit continues to 
express its distrust of class action counsel and the state level courts 
that adjudicate class action cases.9 
In Carol B. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., the Seventh Circuit 
recently affirmed a defendant’s removal of a class action, even though 
the plaintiff had expressly disclaimed damages over $75,000.10 The 
court found that the defendant’s “good faith belief” that the amount in 
controversy would exceed $75,000 outweighed the plaintiff’s express 
disclaimer waiving damages of over $75,000 in her complaint.11 The 
court also affirmed the lower court’s decision not to certify a class.12 It 
                                                 
5 Id. at 837. 
6 E.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff 
disclaimed relief exceeding $75,000 in order to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction). 
7 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
8 Id. Prior to CAFA, class action plaintiffs could avoid federal diversity 
jurisdiction by disclaiming individual amounts in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2005); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 
(1938). Now under CAFA, class action plaintiffs may still do so; however, federal 
courts may have jurisdiction in class actions where the aggregate amount in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), as amended by the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
9 See Oshana, 472 F.3d 506; Johnston, supra note 4. 
10 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 510; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2005) (a defendant can 
remove a civil action on the basis of diversity only if, among other things, the 
plaintiff’s amount in controversy exceeds $75,000). 
11 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 512. 
12 Id. at 513. Class certification is a prerequisite to a class action. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(a). 
2
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did so using an unfamiliar rule,13 potentially creating an impossible 
standard for certain future class action plaintiffs.  
This Note is divided into four Sections. Section I provides a brief 
background on class action law. Section II will touch on the Seventh 
Circuit’s treatment of class action cases. Section III outlines the 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Oshana v. Coca-Cola. Section IV delves 
deeper into the Seventh Circuit’s holding, analyzing where the court 
went wrong. Finally, this Note cautions that Oshana v. Coca-Cola will 
adversely affect plaintiff classes by unnecessarily narrowing the path 
to redress. 
 
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT CLASS ACTION LAW 
 
The general concept of class actions was first codified in 1849 
under the Field Code.14 In 1938, Congress drafted and adopted Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the first federal class 
action rule of its kind.15 Originally, this rule was “to create a class 
action system which could deal with civil rights, and, explicitly, 
segregation.”16 After substantial amendments to the rule, and after 
successful persuasion by attorneys, judges began to expand class 
actions to the area of mass torts.17 Initially, judges were increasingly 
willing to certify these types of classes, believing that individual 
claims would cause serious inefficiencies in state judicial systems.18 
That reasoning continues to be a primary purpose of class actions.19  
                                                 
13 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513-14. 
14 Coby Warren Logan, Federal Class Action Reform Legislation: The 
“Unfair” Approach to Addressing the Issues of Modern Mass Tort Litigation, 40 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1145, 1149 n.34 (2005). The Field Code required that 
numerous parties have a common interest in law or fact. Id. 
15 Id. at 1149. 
16 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on S. 353 Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. (1999) (statement of John P. Frank). 
17 S. REP. 109-14, at 7 (2005). 
18 Id. 
19 See id.; ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2006).  
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Today, the class action is commonly known as the weapon of 
choice for plaintiffs claiming mass personal injuries and products 
liability cases.20 Its effectiveness is derived from the combined force 
of similarly situated plaintiffs that share common questions of law and 
fact, giving each a cost-efficient means to obtain redress.21 Often, 
individual litigants’ claims are “too small to justify legal action.”22 But 
when taken as a whole, numerous litigants can move with greater force 
with a single claim that warrants litigation.23 Class actions are also 
capable of achieving tremendous economies of scale by consolidating 
similar claims.24 Accordingly, class actions avoid multiple suits, 
concurrently producing uniform rulings and holdings across a 
multitude of similarly situated plaintiffs.25 
Plaintiffs typically file class actions in state courts. 26 And 
defendants frequently remove these actions to federal courts through 
the basis of diversity.27 Plaintiffs prefer state courts for several 
reasons. For one, plaintiffs win more often in state courts than in the 
federal forum.28 Some have asserted that class action plaintiffs file in 
state courts because of their “perception of prejudice against corporate 
defendants, a relaxed approach to class certification, and jurors willing 
                                                 
20 See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 19, at § 1.1. 
21 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 56 (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Glenn A. Danas, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: 
Another Congressional Attempt To Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305 
(2000). 
25 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 56 (2007). 
26 Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way 
to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1526 
(2005). 
27 Id. 
28 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really 
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998) (removal of civil cases from state to federal courts 
generally results in a dramatic “drop in the plaintiffs' win rate”); see also Helen 
Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial 
Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003, 1038-39 (2006). 
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to return large monetary verdicts against the defendant.”29 Defendants 
are eager to remove class actions likely for the same reasons.30 
With this in mind, class action reformists steadfastly believe that 
plaintiffs in class actions are unfairly advantaged in state courts, 
especially when their counsel has selectively chosen a forum that he or 
she believes will be lenient to the class.31 These reformists claim that 
the resultant holdings and interpretations of laws are then 
inconsistently applied to parties that span multiple jurisdictions.32 
Also, reformists are concerned that the interests of class members are 
often overlooked, with counsel achieving tremendous settlement 
amounts, and consumers achieving little, if anything, in redress.33  
To address these concerns, Congress recently passed CAFA, 
which made major changes to class action law, expanding federal 
courts’ diversity jurisdiction over class action cases.34 Prior to CAFA, 
defendants to a class action could only remove the suit if it involved a 
federal question or if the requirements of diversity jurisdiction had 
been met.35 Diversity requirements were often difficult to meet: each 
named class representative had to be diverse from all named 
defendants36 and, until 2005, the Supreme Court held that each class 
member had to claim an amount in controversy exceeding the statutory 
minimum.37 Now with CAFA, Congress has vastly expanded federal 
                                                 
29 L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation 
of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 178 (2004); 
see also S. REP. 109-14 (2005). 
30 Norton, supra note 28, at 1038-39. 
31 See generally S. REP. 109-14. Class action reformists believe that the 
majority of class action counsel “game” the procedural rules of class actions, 
keeping multi-state class actions in “state courts whose judges have reputations for 
readily certifying classes and approving settlements.” Id. at 4. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
35 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (2005). 
36 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2005). 
37 Exxon Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558-59 (2005) (holding 
that a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all plaintiffs in a 
5
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jurisdiction over diverse parties of a class action where: (1) any one 
plaintiff (named or unnamed) is diverse from any one defendant; (2) 
the amount in controversy can now be calculated as an aggregate 
amount in controversy ($5,000,000); and (3) there are at least 100 
members in the proposed class.38 
Once a class action has reached its jurisdictional seat, the plaintiff 
moves to certify a class.39 The majority of states, including Illinois,40 
have adopted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
sometimes with minor revisions.41 If a class action is tried in one of 
these states, or if it has been removed to a federal court, class 
certification will require a showing that: the class is sufficiently large, 
the claims are common, the claims of the class representative are 
typical of those of the class, the class is adequately represented, and 
questions of law or fact predominate over the class.42  
Proponents of class action reform welcome pro-reform legislation 
like CAFA, particularly for its federalizing power.43 Often with only a 
cursory analysis, reformists claim that state court judges are too “lax” 
when applying certification requirements.44 They also believe that 
federal courts will “generally . . . pay closer attention to the procedural 
requirements for certifying a matter for class treatment.”45 Reformists 
presumably reach this conclusion based on federal courts’ reluctance 
to certify a class.46 
                                                                                                                   
class if only one such plaintiff had a claim exceeding the amount in controversy, 
$75,000). 
38 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
40 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-801 (1998). 
41 Five states still use rules modeled on the pre-1966 amended Federal Rule 23, 
four use Field Code-based action rules, and three states permit class actions at 
common law. Logan, supra note 14, at 1148. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
43 See S. REP. 109-14. 
44 Id. at 14. 
45 Id. 
46 James E. Pfander, THE SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE OF CLASS 
ACTION REFORM: The Federal Class Action Fairness Act May Seem Limited, but 
Its Impact on Class-Action Litigation Is Anything But, 93 ILL. B.J. 144 (2005).  
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II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT ON CLASS ACTIONS 
  
The Seventh Circuit has consistently expressed its disdain for 
class actions by adjudicating cases, often unfairly, in favor of 
defendants. For example, in 1995, the Seventh Circuit decided a case 
that has now become an oft-cited example of the federal judiciary’s 
disdain for certifying class actions.47 From 1996 to 2005, the Seventh 
Circuit led a pro-defendant stance in a circuit split regarding diversity 
jurisdiction as it applied to class actions.48 After CAFA was enacted in 
2005, the Seventh Circuit chose to interpret the statue and the 
legislative history in favor of defendants attempting to remove class 
action cases commenced prior to the effective date of CAFA.49 
Finally, even with the expansive reach of CAFA’s federal diversity 
jurisdiction laws, the Seventh Circuit continues to federalize class 
actions that should be adjudicated on the state level.50 
In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that in class actions, each class 
member’s claims had to independently satisfy the amount in 
controversy requirement in order to qualify for diversity jurisdiction.51 
In 1990, Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act, conferring 
supplemental jurisdiction on federal courts.52 The Seventh Circuit was 
the first of four circuits to interpret the act in favor of class action 
defendants: federal district courts would now have the authority to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all class action plaintiffs if just 
                                                                                                                   
Of course, a reluctance to certify alone is no indication that federal courts are 
necessarily correct, or that the federal forum is superior to the state forum. In fact, 
many view federal courts as hostile towards class actions, where some courts are 
taking unusual measure to federalize, then reject certification. See Oshana v. Coca-
Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2006); Johnston, supra note 4, at 837. 
47 In re Rhone-Poulenc River, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
48 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996); see 
also S. REP. 109-14, at nn.28 & 29. 
49 Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2006). 
50 Oshana, 472 F.3d 506. 
51 Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
52 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988). 
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one plaintiff satisfied the amount in controversy.53 The Seventh Circuit 
was steadfast in its stance up and through 2005, when the Supreme 
Court finally held that a federal district court could exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a putative class where only one plaintiff 
satisfied the amount in controversy.54 
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit wrote a heavily criticized opinion 
regarding a class action55 that has now become an example of one 
federal court’s express disdain for class actions.56 In In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., Judge Posner issued a writ of mandamus against 
the trial judge, decertifying a class “[w]ithout attempting to 
demonstrate that the putative plaintiff class did not meet the 
requirements of Federal Rule 23.”57 Instead, Posner relied on two 
primary arguments, each ignoring the analysis required in Rule 23.58 
First, Posner stated that the case had “demonstrated [a] great 
likelihood that the plaintiffs’ claims, despite their human appeal, 
lack[ed] legal merit.”59 He drew this from an “inference from the 
defendants having won 92.3 percent (12/13) of the cases to have gone 
to judgment.”60 The court stated that it was “concern[ed] with forcing 
these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single 
jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if 
they had no legal liability.”61 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the 
twelve of thirteen cases that had gone to judgment has been 
characterized as nothing more than a “merits assessment in thin 
                                                 
53 Stromberg, 77 F.3d 928; see also Exxon Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 
546, 550 (2005); Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004); Allapattah 
Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 
263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001). 
54 Exxon Corp., 545 U.S. at 550. 
55 In re Rhone-Poulenc River, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
56 Danas, supra note 24, at 1315. Class action reformists, on the other hand, 
“consistently embrace[] these opinions.” Id.  
57 Id. 
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disguise.”62 Such an assessment flies in the face of the “fundamental 
tenet of federal class action law that a court should not evaluate the 
merits of a claim at the certification stage.”63 In her dissent, Judge 
Rovner questioned the majority’s comment that the defendants had too 
much at stake for a single jury to decide on.64 Rovner focused on 
Federal Rule 23, stating that the majority’s contentions were at odds 
with Rule 23; certification of a class was to be based on the 
requirements of Rule 23, “regardless of the magnitude of potential 
liability.”65 
Since February 2005, the Seventh Circuit has been busy 
interpreting and applying CAFA.66 In Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit held that CAFA applied to a class 
action that was filed in state court prior to CAFA’s effective date.67 
After the state court entered a default judgment on the merits against 
defendant insurance company for its “egregious” behavior, the 
representative plaintiff requested that the state court certify a class that 
would hold the defendant responsible for all policies issued by any of 
its subsidiaries or affiliates.68 On an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit held that such a request constituted a claim that did not relate 
back to the original complaint, where the original complaint did not 
                                                 
62 Danas, supra note 24, at 1315 (quoting Mass Torts and Class Action 
Lawsuits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Elizabeth Cabraser, 
Esq., Lief, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP)).  
63 Danas, supra note 24, at 1315 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
64 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1307 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 1308 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
66 CAFA states that defendants can remove only those cases that have been 
“commenced” on or after February 18, 2005. 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). The exact 
meaning of the term “commenced” has been substantially litigated since the adoption 
of CAFA. SIMONETTI, LISA. STROOCK SPECIAL BULLETIN, WHEN IS AN ACTION 
“COMMENCED” UNDER THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (2006) 
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub434.pdf. 
67 435 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2006). 
68 Id at 756. 
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include all of the defendants’ allegedly unfair policies.69 
Notwithstanding that the class action had commenced prior to CAFA, 
the Seventh Circuit held that such a request was considered a “novel 
claim,” one which would bring the class action within the scope of 
CAFA.70 
 
III. OSHANA V. COCA-COLA 
 
In one of its most recent class action cases, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the removal of a plaintiff’s class action despite her expressly 
disclaiming damages above $75,000.71 The court then held that class 
certification was properly denied.72 In Oshana v. Coca-Cola, the 
plaintiff, Oshana, filed a putative class action against Coke in an 
Illinois state court alleging that Coke had violated the Illinois 
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (“ICFA”) and had also 
been unjustly enriched.73 Oshana alleged that Coke tricked consumers 
into believing that fountain Diet Coke and bottled Diet Coke contained 
the same ingredients.74 Specifically, Oshana claimed, in relevant part, 
that Coke advertised that Diet Coke was sweetened with 100% 
aspartame, when in fact, fountain Diet Coke contained a mixture of 
both aspartame and saccharin.75 Despite Oshana disclaiming 
individual damages over $75,000, Coke removed the class action to 
federal court and defeated Oshana’s motion for class certification.76 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 758. 
71 Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc 
denied. 
72 Id. at 513. 
73 The originally named plaintiff was David Hahn. Id. at 509, n.1. Carol Oshana 
substituted Hahn after he voluntarily withdrew. Id. For the purposes of this Note, 
plaintiff will be referred to as Oshana. 
74 Id. at 509. 
75 Aspartame and saccharin are artificial sweeteners. They are distinguishable 
both chemically and by preference. Leticia M. Diaz, Sucralose: The Sugar of the 
New Millennium—FDA’s Role: A Hindrance or a Help?, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 
374-77 (2000). 
76 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 509-10. 
10
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Coke made an offer of judgment for $650 plus reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs, and Oshana accepted, reserving the right to appeal the 
issues of jurisdiction and the denial of class certification.77 The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed both rulings of the district court.78 A motion 
for rehearing en banc was denied.79 
Oshana brought this class action on behalf of “[a]ll individuals 
who purchased for consumption and not resale fountain Diet Coke 
in . . . Illinois from March 12, 1999, through the date of entry of an 
order certifying the class.”80 On behalf of this class, she complained 
that “Coke began advertising in 1984 that Diet Coke would be 
sweetened with 100% NutraSweet® brand aspartame, leading 
consumers to believe that all forms of Diet Coke would follow that 
formula, even though fountain Diet Coke continued to use 
saccharin.”81 She sought compensatory damages, disgorgement of 
Coke’s profits from the sale of fountain Diet Coke in Illinois, 
attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other relief the court saw fit to 
grant.82  
Oshana disclaimed individual damages over $75,000.83 
Specifically, the complaint contained an express ad damnum84 stating 
that “[p]laintiff seeks no relief, cause of action, remedy, or damages 
that confer federal jurisdiction upon the claims asserted herein, and 
expressly disclaims individual damages in excess of $75,000.”85 Coke 
thought the disclaimer was “unclear.”86 Coke then requested that 
Oshana admit that in the event that the class was not certified, she 
                                                 
77 Id. at 510. 
78 Id. at 510, 513. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 510. 
81 Id. at 509. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 An ad damnum is “[a] clause in a prayer for relief stating the amount of 
damages claimed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 31 (7th ed. 2000). 
85 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 511; Br. of Pet’r-Appellant at 6, 9, Oshana v. Coca-Cola 
Co., No. 05-3640 (7th Cir. 2005). 
86 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 509. 
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would not personally seek relief greater than $75,000.87 Despite 
Oshana’s express disavowal of any relief that would confer federal 
jurisdiction, Coke removed the case to federal court claiming a good-
faith belief that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.88 The 
district court denied Oshana’s motion to remand, concluding that Coke 
may have reasonably believed that Oshana’s damages could plausibly 
exceed $75,000.89 The district court denied class certification, holding 
that Oshana could not meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.90 
The Seventh Circuit analyzed removal and certification 
separately.91 As a preliminary matter, the court indicated that Oshana’s 
case was not within the scope of CAFA because it had been filed 
before CAFA was enacted.92 Although the court admitted that 
disclaimers of damages have been a “long approved [] way of staying 
out of federal court,” it concluded that in Illinois, such disclaimers in 
complaints do not bind plaintiffs.93 As such, the court held that 
Oshana’s disclaimer had no legal effect.94 The court then stated that 
because Oshana refused to formally disclaim damages in the event that 
the class was not certified, Coke had a good-faith belief that the 
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, notwithstanding Oshana’s 
express ad damnum disclaimer.95  
With respect to certification, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s analysis, that Oshana failed to meet the requirements of 
Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.96 The 
district court determined that the proposed class was “not sufficiently 
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 510. 
91 The court reviewed the propriety of removal de novo. Id. 
92 Id. at 511. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 512. 
96 Id. at 513. The court reviewed the district court’s analysis with an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. Id. 
12
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definite to warrant a class certification.”97 Specifically, the district 
court stated that the class could “potentially include millions of 
customers,” some of which may not have been deceived by Coke’s 
marketing, because “at least some of Coke’s ads contained a 
disclaimer.”98 Accordingly, the district court held that part of the class 
could not show any damage proximately caused by Coke’s alleged 
deception, a requirement in a claim for damages under the ICFA.99 For 
the same reasons, the district court held that Oshana’s claims were not 
typical of the putative class.100 The court elaborated further, stating 
that some of the proposed class members may have consumed Diet 
Coke knowing that it contained saccharin, whereas Oshana had 
claimed she was deceived.101 With respect to typicality,102 the Seventh 
Circuit stated that Oshana’s claim was subject to certain specific 
factual defenses, which undermined the typicality requirement.103 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that Oshana failed to state a 
claim for unjust enrichment on behalf of a class.104 The court 
explained that Oshana needed to "show[] that Coke benefitted to her 
detriment, and that Coke's retention of the profits would violate the 
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience."105 The 
Court further held that "in this case Coke cannot have been unjustly 
enriched without proof of deception."106 
 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 510. 
99 Id. at 514. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 “Typicality” is one of the requirements for class certification. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23 (a)(3). “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if . . . the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Id. 
103 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514. 
104 Id. at 515. 
105 Id. (citing HPI Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 
N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ill. App. 1998)). 
106 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 515. 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN  
OSHANA V. COCA-COLA 
 
The holding in Oshana v. Coca-Cola exemplifies the Seventh 
Circuit’s continued distrust of class action counsel, particularly those 
operating on the state level. In light of CAFA’s expansion of federal 
jurisdiction in class actions, federal courts must now be particularly 
careful in drawing distinctions between cases that qualify for federal 
jurisdiction, and those that do not. CAFA creates a necessary balance 
between injured plaintiffs and diverse defendants.107 Federal courts 
must acknowledge this change, and refrain from further expanding 
federal jurisdiction, upsetting the balance that Congress has struggled 
to achieve.108 
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit fails in this regard. In its 
opinion in Oshana v. Coca-Cola, the court makes clear that, 
notwithstanding the federalizing power of CAFA, it will continue to 
affirm removals even when plaintiffs have disclaimed an amount in 
controversy exceeding the statutory minimum. Further, this case 
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit is taking unusual measure to 
keep plaintiff classes from certifying. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
Oshana v. Coca-Cola affirms its hostility towards class actions, one 
that does not seem to be assuaged by the passage of CAFA. Ironically, 
it is this type of federal hostility towards class actions that has 





In Oshana v. Coca-Cola, the Seventh Circuit rejected an express 
disclaimer of damages stated within Oshana’s complaint.110 First, the 
court looked to the Supreme Court holding in St. Paul Mercury 
                                                 
107 See S. REP. 109-14 (2005). 
108 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
109 Danas, supra note 24, at 1307. 
110 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 511. 
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Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. to establish a framework for its analysis 
of removal.111 The Seventh Circuit stated that “[o]nce the 
defendant . . . has established the requisite amount in controversy, the 
plaintiff can defeat jurisdiction only if ‘it appears to a legal certainty 
that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.’”112 The 
court’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding was incorrect. 
The Supreme Court in Mercury held that when a plaintiff claims 
an amount in controversy above the statutory minimum in order to 
bring the case in federal court, the defendant must prove “to a legal 
certainty that the claim is really for less than the [statutory minimum] 
to justify dismissal.”113 In dicta, the Court confirmed the natural 
corollary to the rule: if the plaintiff “does not desire to try his case in 
the federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than 
the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to 
more, the defendant cannot remove.”114 The Court went no further, 
choosing not to expound on the burden of proof in such a case.115 
Circuit courts, however, agree that it is the defendant’s burden to 
demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory 
minimum if the plaintiff claims otherwise.116 The Third and Ninth 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 
(1938)). 
113 Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289 (stating that it would need to be “apparent, to a 
legal certainty . . . from the proofs” that the plaintiff’s claim was for less than the 
statutory minimum) (emphasis added). 
114 Id. at 294 (emphasis added). 
115 Id. 
116 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 511 (stating that “[b]ecause [the defendant] is the 
proponent of jurisdiction, it has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence facts that suggest the amount-in-controversy requirement is met”); see also 
Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 2007); In re Hot-Hed 
Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 
2006); Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005); Altimore v. 
Mount Mercy Coll., 420 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2005); Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005); Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 
811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 
F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1290 
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Circuits have specifically held that when a plaintiff claims an amount 
in controversy less than the statutory minimum (to avoid federal 
court), the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that the amount in 
controversy is greater than the statutory minimum.117 Such a rule is in 
accord with the Supreme Court’s rule in Mercury. In Mercury, the 
defendant needed to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in 
controversy was less than the statutory minimum in order to avoid 
federal court.118 In the Third and Ninth Circuit cases, the defendant 
needed to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy was 
greater than the statutory minimum in order to avoid state court.119 
The Seventh Circuit, however, completely modified the Supreme 
Court’s rule; this modification required the plaintiff, for the first time, 
to prove to a legal certainty that her claim was for less than the 
statutory minimum.120 Specifically, the court held that “[o]nce the 
defendant in a removal case has established the requisite amount in 
controversy, the plaintiff can defeat jurisdiction if ‘it appears to a legal 
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional 
amount.’”121 Indeed, the court recognized that the defendant initially 
bore the burden of establishing that the amount in controversy 
exceeded the statutory minimum. However, it then took the legal 
certainty standard in Mercury and flipped it into a plaintiff’s burden.122 
                                                                                                                   
(10th Cir. 2001); Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
117 Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he party seeking removal must prove with ‘legal certainty’ that the amount in 
controversy is satisfied, notwithstanding the prayer for relief in the complaint”); 
Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The party wishing to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction has the burden to prove to a legal certainty that the 
amount in controversy exceeds the statutory threshold”). 
118 Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289. 
119 Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 996; Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474. 
120 Oshana, 472, F.3d at 511. 
121 Id. (citing Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289) (emphasis added). 
122 To my knowledge, the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court to have made 
such a drastic modification of the legal certainty standard. The Fifth Circuit has even 
stated that the “legal certainty” standard is “limited in utility to cases in which the 
plaintiff himself has placed the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy by 
16
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In Oshana v. Coca-Cola, Oshana disclaimed damages exceeding the 
statutory minimum.123 The court found that her refusal to admit to 
Coke’s requests amounted in Coke meeting its burden of establishing 
that the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory minimum.124 
The court then went back to the disclaimers and erroneously applied 
the legal certainty standard, questioning if the disclaimers proved to a 
legal certainty that Oshana’s claims for damages did not exceed the 
statutory minimum.125 The court then cleverly stated that disclaimers 
in Illinois “had no legal effect.”126 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s 
modified rule forced Oshana’s disclaimers to hold up to an impossible 
legal certainty standard. 
The court then carried on, explaining why disclaimers had no 
legal effect in Illinois. In its scant analysis, the court cited to two of its 
own cases: BEM I L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc. and The Barbers, 
Hairstyling for Men & Women, Inc. v. Lela Bishop.127 The majority in 
Barbers, though discussing a similar issue, never ruled on the matter 
of disclaimers.128 In Barbers, the court held that a binding cap on 
damages prevents removal.129 The court remarked, however, that 
pleadings in Illinois are non-binding.130 When it posed the question of 
what “effect to give to non-binding pleadings” with respect to 
removal, the court stated that “this circuit has not yet come to rest,” 
and that “the standard is hazy.”131 The court ultimately held that such 
an issue need not be decided for that case.132 In BEM I, the plaintiff 
had filed a motion to increase its damages from $48,000 to $88,000 
                                                                                                                   
requesting damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount.” De Aguilar v. Boeing 
Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1409 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
123 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 511. 
124 Id. at 512-13. 
125 Id. at 511-12. 
126 Id. at 511. 
127 Id. at 511. 
128 Barbers, Hairstyling for Men & Women, Inc. v. Bishop, 132 F.3d 1203, 
1205 (7th Cir. 1997). 
129 Id. 
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while the case was still in state court.133 When the plaintiff discovered 
that the defendant intended to remove the case, “it immediately 
withdrew the motion” before the state court judge acted on it, in order 
to prevent removal.134 The court stated that such conduct was 
“egregious,” because “even while withdrawing its motion for the 
additional [damages] it continued to claim that the additional 
[damages] was owed it.”135 Knowing this, the court stated that 
rescinding the enlarged claim for damages had “no effect on the actual 
stakes in the case.”136 Because the court knew from the plaintiff’s 
actions that more than $75,000 was at stake, the court affirmed the 
removal of the case.137 Indeed, BEM I exemplified that prayers of 
damages in Illinois are non-binding, especially when the plaintiff 
affirmatively claims additional damages. But, without any discussion 
or analysis of the effect of disclaimers, this case provided no insight 
into the Oshana’s case.138  
The court focused most of its efforts on analyzing Oshana’s 
disclaimers and whether they proved, to a legal certainty, that her 
claims were less than the statutory minimum.139 However, in applying 
its newfound rule, the court initially asked whether Coke had 
established that Oshana’s amount in controversy exceeded the 
statutory minimum.140 The court’s analysis was even sparser here than 
before. The court began by stating that “[b]ecause Coke is the 
proponent of jurisdiction, it has the burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence facts that suggest the amount-in-
controversy is met.”141 The court then held that Coke’s “inference,” 
that Oshana’s claim may be worth more than the statutory minimum, 
satisfied this burden.142 The court did not refer again to the 
                                                 
133 BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 2002). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 552. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 554. 
138 See id. 
139 Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 510-13 (7th Cir. 2006). 
140 Id. at 512. 
141 Id. at 511. 
142 Id. at 512. 
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preponderance of the evidence standard. Instead, it focused on the 
effect of Oshana’s refusal to respond to certain of Coke’s requests for 
admissions.143 In an ad damnum to her complaint, Oshana expressly 
stated: “Plaintiff seeks no relief, cause of action, remedy or damages 
that would confer federal jurisdiction upon the claims asserted herein, 
and expressly disclaims individual damages in excess of $75,000.”144 
Nevertheless, Coke requested that Oshana admit that in the event that 
the class was not certified, she would not personally seek relief 
amounting to more than $75,000.145 The court seemingly ignored 
Oshana’s reason for refusing to make such admissions to Coke.146 She 
stated that the defendant’s requests amounted to requests to reveal her 
future litigation strategy.147 Specifically, she stated: 
 
Defendant’s state law requests for admission did not ask 
for admissions regarding the allegations of the 
Complaint, but asked for admissions regarding what 
Plaintiff’s future litigation strategy would be if class 
certification was denied. For example: ‘Admit that you 
will not seek to disgorge the profit Coca-Cola made 
from the conduct alleged in this lawsuit in the event that 
the class is not certified. . .’. (R.1, App. B-26).148  
 
Oshana further explained that she believed such an admission called 
for privileged attorney work product.149 She then made the compelling 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. Coke asked Oshana to admit in formal Requests for Admission that in 
the event the class was not certified, she would not personally seek “(1) 
disgorgement of Coke’s profits; (2) punitive damages in excess of $75,000; (3) 
attorneys’ fees in excess of $75,000; (4) an award of compensatory and punitive 
damages and attorneys’ fees in excess of $75,000; or (5) an award of disgorgement, 
punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees in excess of $75,000.” Id. 
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argument that if the defendant conferred with her counsel first, as was 
required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k), she would have been 
willing to resolve the issue, admitting only to the relief sought and not 
to any possible litigation strategy.150 Unfortunately, the court was 
silent on this issue.151 Oshana’s refusal to admit future litigation 
strategy, apparently gave Coke an “inference” that trumped Oshana’s 
express disclaimer that she would seek no relief that would confer 
federal jurisdiction.152 The court, thus, implied that a class action 
plaintiff’s failure admit to future litigation strategy (should 
certification be denied), would render a plaintiff’s express disclaimer 
not only devoid of “legal effect,” but completely meaningless.153  
Finally, the court stressed that Oshana’s disclaimer was silent on 
attorney’s fees and punitive damages, both of which could escalate the 
total amount in controversy over the statutory minimum.154 
Conveniently, the court focused only on the second half of Oshana’s 
disclaimer, which limited personal damages to $75,000.155 The court 
completely ignored the most vital part of Oshana’s disclaimer, namely, 
that she “seeks no relief, cause of action, remedy or damages that 
would confer federal jurisdiction.”156 This was Oshana’s catch-all. No 
matter what combination of values the defendant calculated, by the 
plain language in the disclaimer, the total value was not to exceed the 
statutory minimum.157 The court summarily dismissed Oshana’s 
disclaimer of relief sought, ignoring the plain language of her 
complaint.158 Even if Oshana’s disclaimer of specific damages had no 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 See Oshana, 472 F.3d 506. 
152 The court in Oshana v. Coca-Cola never attempted to explain why Oshana 
would have to limit her relief in possible future litigation. See Oshana, 472 F.3d 506. 
Indeed, if Oshana’s class certification had been denied and her case dismissed 
without prejudice, she may well have filed a new individual complaint against Coke 
seeking a new set of damages. 
153 Id. at 511-12. 
154 Id. at 511. 
155 Id. at 511-13. 
156 Id. at 511. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 511-13. 
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
534 
legal effect or consequence, the plain language of her complaint stated 
that she sought no action that would confer federal jurisdiction in any 
way.159 The court’s refusal to give credence to her disclaimer is a clear 
indication that it ruled with an eye towards a particular finding, that 
removal in Oshana’s case was proper.  
The court’s actions reveal its known distrust of class action 
counsel. The court continues to fear that plaintiffs may game the 
system by disclaiming relief sought, then amend their complaint to 
seek greater relief once the defendant’s opportunity to remove has 
passed.160 Indeed, the gaming of the class action system is a valid 
concern, but protections do exist against such “antics”161; for example, 
the recent enactment of CAFA.162 Aggregate claims for damages can 
now automatically trigger federal jurisdiction.163 Further, courts can 
prevent such antics by exercising varying degrees of judicial 
control.164 A case from the Northern District of Illinois recently 
discussed such preventative measures in Hahn v. PepsiCo, Inc.165 In a 
case virtually identical to Oshana v. Coca-Cola, the court 
acknowledged the concerns discussed by the Seventh Circuit, concerns 
that defendants to class actions undoubtedly share.166 The district court 
stated that it does not share the defendant’s “mistrust of the state 
court—a belief that [the state court] will allow plaintiffs to game the 
system.”167 It went on to state that “[p]laintiffs do not have an absolute 
right to amend their pleadings [citation omitted]. The decision to grant 
                                                 
159 Id. at 511. 
160 Id. at 512-13. 
161 Hahn v. PepsiCo, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
162 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
163 Id. 
164 PepsiCo, 350 F. Supp. 2d 758. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 764. The plaintiffs in this case had a near identical disclaimer as that 
found in Oshana v. Coca-Cola. Id. at 761. The defendant in PepsiCo also requested 
that the plaintiffs admit that they would not seek various damages in excess of 
$75,000 in the event that a class was not certified. Id. When the plaintiffs refused to 
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leave to amend rests with the Illinois courts.”168 The court expounded 
upon the considerations a state court may make in granting leave to 
amend: 
 
(1) [W]hether the proposed amendment would cure the 
defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would 
sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed 
amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is 
timely; and (4) whether previous opportunities to 
amend the pleading could be identified. The court's 
primary consideration is whether allowing the 
amendment would further the ends of justice.169 
 
The court was confident that state courts are prepared to prevent 
unacceptable gaming by plaintiffs attempting to avoid federal 
jurisdiction.170 As such, it granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand.171 
CAFA also quashes many concerns shared by the Seventh Circuit 
and defendants to class actions.172 In class actions where the aggregate 
amount in controversy is over $5,000,000, disclaimers relating to the 
statutory minimum of $75,000 are indeed meaningless.173 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit should not invalidate disclaimers of 
damages and force class action plaintiffs to legally bind their future 
litigation strategy as it did in Oshana v. Coca-Cola; circumstances still 
do exist where disclaimers of damages in class actions are relevant. 
Take for example a class action with a proposed class membership of 
less than one hundred; CAFA does not apply to such a class.174 
Plaintiffs should have the flexibility to disclaim damages exceeding 
$75,000 without having to legally bind themselves to future litigation 
                                                 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 765 (quoting Hayes Mech., Inc. v. First Indus., L.P., 351 Ill. App. 3d 
1, 7 (2004)). 
170 PepsiCo, 350 F. Supp. 2d 765. 
171 Id. 
172 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
173 Id. at § 1332(d)(2). 
174 Id. at § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
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strategy should their proposed class not be certified. Likewise, 
disclaimers are also useful in cases where CAFA does apply. Class 
action plaintiffs have already begun disclaiming aggregate damages 




The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the lower court’s decision not 
to certify a class in Oshana v. Coca-Cola.176 In order to certify a class 
of plaintiffs, the putative class must satisfy all four requirements of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation—and any one of the 
conditions of Rule 23(b).177 The Seventh Circuit, however, has added 
an additional component to the rule, requiring that the class be 
“identifiable.”178 In Oshana v. Coca-Cola, the court explained that 
“[t]he plaintiff must also show [citation omitted] that the class is 
indeed identifiable as a class.” It remarked that the class must “exist” 
for the purposes of a class action.179 Requiring, from the outset, that 
the Oshana meet this “identifiable” class requirement added an 
inappropriate burden on Oshana.180 And the manner in which the court 
applied the rule made it nearly impossible for Oshana to certify her 
class. 
The court elaborated on its requirement, stating that a class is 
“identifiable” if it is not overly difficult to ascertain which individuals 
                                                 
175 See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2006). 
176 Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006). 
177 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513. 
178 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513 (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 
1981)). 
179 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513 (quoting Simer, 661 F.2d at 669). 
180 See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 19, at § 2.3: 
[A] rule for the existence of a class at the outset of litigation 
reveals that [courts] are actually concerned about ambiguous 
pleadings . . . and difficulties with identifying individual members 
of the class. . . . It is now settled law that amorphous, vague, and 
indeterminate classes are implicitly authorized under new Rule 23. 
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belong in the class.181 In other words, the court took on the additional 
task of gauging the difficulty of identifying common and typical class 
members.182 Using its concept of “identifiable” classes, the court 
constructed yet another standard: if a class is not sufficiently definite, 
certification will not be granted.183 The court then applied the facts of 
the case to the new standard.184 The court explained that for a damages 
claim under the ICFA, the plaintiff must show that she was deceived in 
some manner and damaged by the deception.185 It went on to state that 
because Oshana’s proposed class included some consumers that were 
aware of the ingredients in Diet Coke, that those individuals would not 
be able to show any damage from any of Coke’s actions.186 In other 
words, the court held that the proposed class was over-inclusive. But 
the court cited to no authority that required a formula for gauging 
over-inclusivity.187 Indeed, asserting a proposed class that is overly 
broad could be counter-productive to the class action.188 But, class 
actions were created to benefit the individual plaintiff that had no 
other form of redress. For a court to require that a plaintiff propose a 
class exceedingly narrow would create the obvious the risk of closing 
out those that were indeed harmed. It seems to go against the very idea 
of class actions for a court to deny certification and perhaps deny 
redress to numerous plaintiffs because a handful of plaintiffs in a 
proposed a class might include individuals that were not actually 
harmed. In some cases, courts are even willing to help re-define the 
class189 at least in an attempt to help plaintiffs gain redress.190 
                                                 
181 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513-14. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 513. 




188 Alistair Dawson & Geoff Gannaway, House Bill 4, Class-Certification 
Requirements, and Res Judicata, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 913, 935 (2005).  
189 James H. Geary, Federal Opinion Notes – Western District, 77 MICH. B. J. 
978 (1998). 
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In Oshana v. Coca-Cola, it was imperative that Oshana cast a 
broad net to capture as many potential plaintiffs as she could in her 
proposed class. The court incorrectly burdened Oshana, essentially 
demanding that she produce a means of then discovering which of the 
potential millions of plaintiffs were aware of the ingredients in Diet 
Coke.191 Such a determination could have been made at the individual 
notice requirement stage.192 If Oshana, after reasonable efforts, was 
not able to identify all members of the proposed class, she could have 
used any number of methods to properly identify her proposed class, 
such as, but not limited to newspaper publications, television 
broadcasts, or even radio broadcasts.193 “Publication in newspapers or 
journals may be advisable as a supplement; it is necessary if class 
members are not identifiable after reasonable effort.”194 Publication is 
utilized widely in mass tort and product liability class suits “in an 
effort to inform more potential class members, and principally to 
notify and inform affected persons.”195 Denying class certification 
from the outset because it is not identifiable is not part of the federal 
rules, and should not be imposed upon class action plaintiffs. The 
Seventh Circuit’s choice to do so is yet another example of its express 




Prior to CAFA, plaintiff classes and their counsel had what some 
called the power to “game” the system.196 CAFA was specifically 
drafted to address these types of concerns, namely, the concerns that 
plaintiffs could disclaim individual damages, no matter how large the 
                                                                                                                   
190 See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 19, at § 2.3. “[T]he court has full power 
under Rule 23 to resolve the ambiguity by redefining the class or affording the 
representative plaintiff an opportunity to do so.” Id. 
191 Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514. 
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
193 See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 19, at § 8.3. 
194 Manual for Complex Litigation (3d ed.) § 30.211(emphasis added). 
195 See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 19, at § 8.3. 
196 S. REP. 109-14, at 9. 
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aggregate amount was, in order to stay out of federal court.197 Under 
CAFA, plaintiff classes are now severely restricted in their ability to 
keep cases in state courts.198 If plaintiffs are to maintain the power and 
flexibility to move as a class, the Seventh Circuit must allow class 
action plaintiffs to disclaim their damages in order to stay out of 
federal court. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit must acknowledge the 
balancing effect of CAFA, and refrain from overly burdening plaintiffs 
when moving to certify their class.  
 
 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).  
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